Private credit is showing signs of strain, but the extent of the problem depends heavily on how stress is defined. Several widely followed measures put troubled loans at around 1% to 3% of the relevant portfolios. An analysis by J.P. Morgan’s Michael Cembalest found that the proportion of positions experiencing some form of stress had doubled from 8% in 2022 to 16%.
The analysis, published in October 2026, uses a broader definition of stress than conventional default measures.
These figures are not contradictory. They measure different things. The distinction is important for investors trying to assess whether reported default rates adequately capture the risks building up in private credit.
The problem with measuring stress
Private credit refers here to loans originated or held by investment funds and other non-bank lenders, often to medium-sized and sponsor-owned companies. These loans are generally not traded in the same way as broadly syndicated loans, making market-based price discovery more difficult.
Five to seven years ago, underwriting standards in parts of the private credit market were often stricter than those in the broadly syndicated loan market. Direct negotiations between lenders and borrowers could allow lenders to negotiate contractual protections and earn additional returns for providing capital through a less liquid market.
The subsequent inflow of capital has raised questions about whether underwriting discipline has kept pace with competition to deploy money. The extent to which lending terms have weakened varies across the market, and establishing the trend requires evidence on covenant terms, payment-in-kind provisions and restrictions on asset transfers. These changes should not be assumed to have occurred uniformly across private credit.
The concern is not simply that more borrowers may default. It is that the contractual and accounting measures used to identify deterioration may not capture the full extent of the problem.
A borrower that cannot meet its original repayment schedule might negotiate an extension, accept a higher interest rate or capitalise interest instead of paying it in cash. These arrangements can keep a loan performing according to its revised terms, even though the borrower is no longer meeting the original agreement.
Restructuring is not necessarily evidence of an eventual loss. It can preserve value for both borrower and lender. But repeated amendments can also defer the recognition of financial difficulties and delay the point at which a loan’s underlying value becomes clear.
Why the reported figures differ
Several established providers track indicators of private credit stress, including Lincoln International, Houlihan Lokey, Proskauer, S&P and KBRA. Their figures cover different borrower populations and use different definitions. Some measures include covenant breaches; others focus on defaults, non-accrual loans or other specific indicators.
Consequently, a reported stress or default rate of 1% to 3% should not be interpreted as a comprehensive estimate of the proportion of private credit exposures experiencing financial difficulties.
J.P. Morgan addressed this comparability problem by applying a common set of criteria to identify stressed positions. The framework covers five categories:
Non-accrual loans: loans on which lenders have stopped recognising interest income because collection is no longer sufficiently certain.
Distressed payment-in-kind interest: loans where borrowers capitalise interest instead of paying it in cash.
Certain maturity extensions: loans extended by more than two years where the loan is priced below 95 cents on the dollar.
Debt converted into equity following foreclosure: situations in which lenders have taken control of collateral or converted debt into an equity position.
Deeply discounted or otherwise distressed positions: loans valued below 80 cents on the dollar for reasons not already captured by the other categories.
Using this framework, J.P. Morgan found that the proportion of positions experiencing stress in the defined private credit universe had increased from 8% in 2022 to 16%.
This is a broader measure than a conventional default rate. It captures certain forms of deterioration and restructuring before they necessarily result in a recognised default or realised loss.
What the individual indicators tell us
The published data remain useful, provided that their limitations are recognised.
Business development companies, or BDCs, are publicly traded or non-traded investment vehicles that lend primarily to private companies. Their disclosures provide one of the more accessible windows into private credit performance. Non-accrual rates are particularly useful because they indicate when lenders have stopped recognising contractual interest as income. However, this measure can lag behind deterioration in a borrower’s finances, especially when the loan has been amended before being classified as non-accrual.
Lincoln International tracks covenant breaches and other indicators of loan performance. Its measures can identify pressure that has not yet resulted in a formal default. Payment-in-kind interest is another relevant indicator: when borrowers increasingly pay interest by adding it to the outstanding principal, the lender may continue to record income even though the borrower is not generating enough cash to meet its interest obligations.
Houlihan Lokey’s loan database provides another perspective, including differences between borrower groups and the distribution of loan valuations. A low aggregate default rate can conceal weaker performance among smaller borrowers or a concentration of positions trading at substantial discounts to face value.
Proskauer tracks defaults among loans involving its lender clients, while S&P and KBRA provide additional evidence from rated borrowers and reported loan portfolios. Each dataset has value, but none should be treated as interchangeable with the others.
The available figures should not simply be averaged. Differences in coverage, definitions and reporting periods make such a calculation potentially misleading. The more useful exercise is to understand what each measure captures, identify what it omits and assess whether the indicators collectively point to a deterioration in credit quality.
How credit deterioration unfolds
A borrower in difficulty does not necessarily default immediately. The sequence can instead involve weaker cash generation, a breach of financial covenants, an amendment to the loan agreement, capitalised interest and a maturity extension. Only later might the loan be classified as non-accrual, written down or defaulted.
Not every restructuring follows this sequence, and an amendment can be the economically sensible solution. Nevertheless, the distinction between contractual performance and underlying financial health is important.
Private credit also presents a valuation challenge. Loans are generally less liquid than publicly traded debt, and lenders may have limited opportunities to test reported valuations through actual sales. If a loan is extended rather than sold, the market price at which an independent buyer would be willing to acquire it may remain unknown.
The risk is therefore twofold: borrowers may be deteriorating, while the extent of any eventual loss remains uncertain. A loan that continues to generate accounting income is not necessarily worth its reported value, particularly if interest is being capitalised or the maturity has been repeatedly extended.
Three indicators deserve particular attention
First, investors should distinguish cash interest from accounting income. Interest coverage calculated using reported earnings or accrued interest can overstate a borrower’s ability to service its debt. A company covering interest expense 1.4 times on an accounting basis but barely covering cash interest payments has substantially less financial flexibility than the headline ratio suggests.
Second, investors should examine the frequency and substance of loan amendments. A single extension may reflect a temporary liquidity problem. Repeated extensions, particularly when accompanied by higher interest rates or weaker contractual protections, may indicate that the original financing assumptions no longer hold. The relevant question is not simply how many amendments have occurred, but why they were necessary and whether the borrower has returned to sustainable cash generation.
Third, the sponsor’s willingness to contribute additional equity can provide useful information. Fresh capital from the owner can reduce leverage and demonstrate a commitment to the business. Conversely, a sponsor that declines to inject capital while seeking further payment deferrals may leave lenders bearing a greater share of the downside. Neither response is conclusive on its own: the sponsor’s resources, the business’s prospects and the terms of any proposed restructuring also need to be considered.
These indicators are most informative when assessed together. A loan with weak cash interest coverage, repeated amendments and no additional equity support warrants closer scrutiny than one showing only an isolated covenant breach.
The implications for investors
J.P. Morgan’s analysis offers a useful illustration of how the definition of stress changes the result. The increase from 8% to 16% indicates that a materially larger share of positions in the defined universe are experiencing some form of stress than conventional default measures alone might suggest. It does not mean that 16% of loans will default or that investors will lose 16% of their capital.
For investors, the practical task is to look beyond headline default rates. Cash interest payments, repeated loan amendments, sponsor support and the reliability of reported valuations provide complementary evidence about the quality of a portfolio.
The market may ultimately absorb the current pressure without large losses. But that conclusion should rest on improving borrower fundamentals and credible evidence of recoverability, rather than on low reported default rates alone.
Alessandro Rovelli
Rovelli Research
Independent credit investment research
