Most of the debate about private credit is being conducted by people who don’t own much of it. The biggest owners are life insurers, and they have a different set of concerns from the rest of the market.
US insurers held about $1.2 trillion of private credit at the end of 2025, according to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). That’s roughly 13% of their cash and invested assets and 21% of their bond holdings. Privately placed securities now account for 48.4% of life insurers’ bond portfolios, up from 37.4% five years ago. The NAIC has singled out $544 billion of privately rated bonds, business development companies and private credit funds for particular attention. Moody’s puts US life insurers’ private and illiquid bond holdings at $807 billion, with the ten largest holders accounting for 44%.
A fund reports the value of its investments. An insurer also has to report how much capital it needs to support them. Those are two very different exercises. And the rules governing the second could have a bigger effect on private credit prices than the next round of borrower defaults.
There are three areas to watch: how insurers classify their investments, how those investments are rated, and where the risk ends up after reinsurance.
First, classification.
The NAIC’s new principles-based bond definition took effect in January 2025. It changed the accounting rules used to decide whether an investment qualifies as an issuer credit obligation, an asset-backed security or neither. In other words, it determines whether an asset can be treated as a bond at all.
The new definition looks at the economic substance of an investment rather than its legal form. Insurers therefore had to check whether their existing holdings still qualified as bonds under the new rules. S&P Global Market Intelligence estimates that nearly $15.4 billion of assets were moved out of the main bond reporting category (Schedule D, Part 1) and into other investment categories. In a more specific group of reclassifications, around 650 bonds worth $1.81 billion were affected.
These amounts are small compared with the $1.2 trillion total. But the underlying mechanism is important. An investment can receive different regulatory treatment even when its borrower has not missed a single payment. Reclassification does not automatically create an accounting loss, but it can change the capital an insurer needs to hold and how the investment appears on its balance sheet.
Second, ratings.
Private credit ratings are not just opinions about the likelihood of repayment. For insurers, they can also determine how much capital an investment requires.
The NAIC is tightening the information that must accompany private letter ratings and building a framework to assess whether rating agencies’ methodologies and rating mappings remain suitable for regulatory purposes.
At the same time, capital requirements for collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) are moving away from simple reliance on external ratings towards direct actuarial modelling. Residual interests in structured securities already carry life risk-based capital factors of 45%, while revised CLO capital factors are due to take effect at the end of 2026.
Regulators are increasingly looking beyond external ratings and seeking capital requirements that better reflect the underlying risk of each investment.
This creates an interesting problem for private credit. When an agency’s private letter rating determines the capital treatment of a billion dollars of investments, that rating becomes part of the asset’s economics. And a private rating is a negotiated document, not an independent market observation. Regulators increasingly want to know how the number was reached.
Third, reinsurance.
This is where things get more complicated, because the insurer holding the risk and the entity ultimately exposed to the losses are not always the same.
Life insurers use reinsurance to transfer some of their obligations to other companies, including offshore affiliates and captive insurers. This can improve capital efficiency, but it also makes it harder for regulators to see where the underlying risks actually sit.
Actuarial guidelines require regulators to check whether insurers have enough assets and reserves to cover their obligations, including when risks have been transferred to offshore affiliates or other reinsurers. They also give greater attention to complex investments, illiquid assets and valuations that are difficult to verify.
US life insurers reported $321 billion of investments in affiliated companies, equivalent to about 5% of general account cash and invested assets.
Regulatory scrutiny is increasing. In May 2026, the US Treasury brought together state insurance commissioners to discuss private credit, offshore reinsurance, private letter ratings and the changing business models of life insurers.
The message is becoming difficult to miss. Regulators want to understand where the risk actually sits, not simply where the reinsurance agreement says it has gone.
Put these three developments together and the usual private credit debate starts to look rather different.
The market has spent the past two years discussing defaults, loan extensions and payment-in-kind interest. These are genuine credit risks. But for the largest holders of private credit, there is another set of questions: Does the investment qualify as a bond? Who provided its rating, and can that rating be defended? And which balance sheet ultimately carries the risk?
Europe has a similar story, but the numbers and the exposures look different.
European insurers' private credit holdings reached approximately €594 billion in the second quarter of 2025, equivalent to 5.8% of total assets, up from €332 billion, or 3.9%, at the end of 2016.
But the headline number hides some important differences between countries. German insurers hold roughly €92 billion of non-listed corporate bonds, compared with about €28 billion for French insurers. Much of the difference comes from promissory note lending, or Schuldschein. Mortgages and loans account for around half of German private credit exposure, against about a quarter in France.
That distinction is important. A Schuldschein issued by a municipal utility is not the same investment as a sponsor-backed unitranche loan. Grouping both under the label of private credit may be convenient, but it can produce misleading conclusions about risk.
European capital requirements are another area to watch, particularly for securitized and illiquid investments. Solvency II is under review, but the available evidence does not yet establish precisely how the 2027 changes will affect capital charges on these assets. I would not build an investment thesis around a specific increase before the final calibration is clear.
Still, any insurer whose investment allocation depends on favourable regulatory treatment has an additional risk to consider. The borrower may continue to perform, but the economics of holding its debt could change.
I spent years buying credit inside an insurance group’s asset manager. One lesson has stayed with me: insurance portfolios rarely sell because someone suddenly changes their mind about credit. They sell because a ratio moves, an auditor asks an uncomfortable question, or a model produces a number the board wasn’t expecting.
Rules make sellers. Credit makes headlines.
The potential losses look manageable against the capital of the largest holders. I am more concerned about the differences that could emerge between insurers holding exactly the same investments.
One insurer may classify a loan as a bond, while another does not. One may rely on a private letter rating, while another uses its own model. One may have transferred part of the risk to a captive reinsurer, while another retains it on its own balance sheet.
The underlying credit is identical. The capital treatment is not. That difference will increasingly influence which insurers want to keep holding these assets and at what price.
The more damaging scenario is narrower, but worth watching. Suppose the 2027 Solvency II review increases capital charges on illiquid and securitized assets just as reinsurance capacity becomes harder to obtain. Insurers may not be forced to sell, but some could decide that holding these investments is no longer worth the capital they consume.
That could leave private credit facing a wave of willing sellers in a market with few natural buyers. The price discovery that investors have been demanding would finally arrive, but possibly at the worst moment for anyone who needs today’s valuations to hold.
If you manage money for an insurer, which of these issues would you least like to be asked about? I read every reply.
Alessandro Rovelli
Rovelli Research
Independent credit investment research

I would ask for the capital impact of a reclassification alongside a cash-liquidity stress test. A higher capital charge and a need to sell assets are separate events. Which disclosure best shows whether an insurer can absorb the former while still meeting policyholder withdrawals without selling illiquid credit?