Private credit expected Medallia, a Software as a service company, to grow fast enough to support its debt. When that growth failed to materialize, the lenders ended up taking control of the company. The 2026 restructuring was not a bankruptcy, but it marked the end of the original investment plan.
Thoma Bravo took Medallia private in 2021 in a deal valued at $6.4 billion, including debt. The equity was worth about $5.5 billion. The financing included more than $2 billion of loans, reportedly priced at SOFR plus 650 basis points, with 400 basis points of interest that could be added to the debt rather than paid in cash. The loans were due in 2028. The original lenders included Blackstone, Apollo, KKR, Thoma Bravo Credit and Antares Capital.
By 2026, unpaid interest and additional borrowing had increased the debt burden. A restructuring completed on 3 August transferred ownership to the lenders and wiped out Thoma Bravo’s equity investment. The lenders also put in $150 million of new capital to support the business. They now own the company they had originally financed.
The problem was not simply that Thoma Bravo paid too much. The deal assumed that software companies would continue to command high valuations and that Medallia would grow enough to support its debt. The lenders made a similar bet. They were willing to lend heavily against the company’s recurring subscription revenue, even though that revenue did not necessarily translate into enough cash to pay interest and repay debt. When growth slowed and software valuations fell, the assumptions behind the deal no longer held.
Recurring revenue is useful because it shows how much subscription income a company expects to receive each year. But does not account for the cost of running the business, winning new customers or keeping existing ones. Nor does it tell lenders how much cash is left to pay interest and repay debt. A company can have substantial recurring revenue and still struggle to service its loans.
The same problem arises when the value of the business depends on expectations of future growth. If customers demand lower prices at renewal, growth slows or artificial intelligence changes how customers use the product, the business may be worth much less than lenders expected. Recurring revenue can help lenders assess a software company, but it cannot replace an analysis of its earnings and cash flow.
The loans paid a margin of 650 basis points above the floating interest rate. That looked attractive, but the spread did not fully compensate lenders for the risks they were taking. They were not just exposed to higher interest rates or a temporary decline in earnings. Their investment also depended on Medallia continuing to grow and retaining a high valuation. If the value of the business falls below its debt, a generous interest margin offers little protection against losses.
The option to add some interest to the debt rather than pay it in cash gave Medallia more breathing room. But it also increased the amount the company owed. Each time interest was added to the balance, the debt grew without bringing in any new cash. This can help a struggling company survive while it improves its business, but it can also delay a reckoning. If earnings do not recover, the growing debt makes the eventual restructuring more difficult.
Medallia’s problems reflect a wider trend in private credit. Houlihan Lokey reported that more than 20% of private-debt transactions included an option to add interest to the loan balance in late 2025, up from 6.9% three years earlier. Software was among the sectors most reliant on these arrangements. I have not found reliable public evidence to support the more specific claim that more than a third of software loan deals included this feature. The broader figures still show that lenders have become more willing to let borrowers defer interest as financing costs rise and refinancing becomes harder.
The restructuring changed who owns Medallia and reduced its debt, while providing $150 million of new capital. But the exact amount of debt left after the deal is not clear from the company’s public disclosures. The often-cited $2.8 billion figure refers to the debt before the restructuring, not a confirmed post-restructuring balance. It would therefore be misleading to treat that figure as the amount the company still owes. To assess Medallia today, lenders need to look at the actual debt remaining, the interest bill and when repayments fall due.
The deal also shows that having several lenders does not necessarily reduce risk. Blackstone, Apollo and KKR participated in the original 2021 financing. HPS, FS KKR, Monroe and Onex were among the lenders holding debt before the restructuring, rather than all being original lenders. These institutions may have entered at different times and prices, but they ultimately faced the same problem: the business was no longer worth enough to support the original financing.
Medallia offers three important lessons. First, recurring revenue can support substantial borrowing only if it generates enough cash to pay the bills and service the debt. Second, deferred interest is not income. It increases the amount a borrower owes and can make a bad situation worse. Third, a long list of sophisticated lenders does not make a deal safe. Several institutions can make the same mistake when they rely on the same assumptions about growth and valuations.
There is still a case for recovery. Medallia has an established customer base and sells software that helps companies understand and improve customer experience. Under lender ownership, it may be able to cut costs, improve its products and return to growth. The new capital gives it some support while it works through these changes.
But the company must improve its business while dealing with its remaining debt. The fact that customer-experience software has a future does not guarantee that Medallia will earn enough to support its financing. What matters is whether it can turn its customer base and revenue into cash.
I remain cautious. The restructuring has given Medallia new owners and fresh capital, but that does not guarantee a successful recovery. I would want to see the company cover its cash interest payments from operating cash flow, retain its customers without having to cut prices too aggressively, and have enough time before its next major debt repayment to deliver on its recovery plan. Without those improvements, the lenders may simply have exchanged troubled loans for ownership of a business that is still struggling.
The next few years should make the outcome clearer. Can Medallia generate enough cash to service its debt before repayments fall due? Are customers renewing at the prices assumed in the recovery plan? If the business underperforms, will the lenders put in more equity, or will they simply extend the debt and delay the problem? The answers will show whether this restructuring has given Medallia a viable future or merely postponed another round of negotiations.
Would you lend against recurring revenue today, and how much debt would you be willing to provide?
Alessandro Rovelli
Rovelli Research
Independent credit investment research
