The latest ECB Bank Lending Survey points to continued selectivity among European banks. That makes the question behind this article more relevant: when a bank declines a refinancing, who steps in, and on what terms? I have watched this process for 25 years. In 2007 and 2008, I saw financing markets close for companies that had looked fine only a quarter earlier. The lesson stayed with me: when banks pull back, access to funding changes before pricing fully reflects the shift. Private credit can fill that gap, but it does not provide the same economics or the same protection to existing bondholders.
The bank market still works for borrowers that fit its risk criteria. A net 7% of euro area banks tightened lending standards for companies in 2Q26, down from 10% in 1Q26, while banks expected another 5% tightening in 3Q26. Autos and energy-intensive manufacturing saw the sharpest tightening. Investment-grade revolvers still clear, while single-B cyclicals often need shorter maturities or wider pricing. The maturity wall points to the same split. Europe reduced its 2028 loan wall by 57.7%, from €90.9 billion to €38.4 billion by July 2026. Refinancings and extensions represented 67% of €110.6 billion of year-to-date loan volume, excluding repricings. Loans due in 2027 fell to €3.7 billion from €9.0 billion at end-2025. I see this as evidence that stronger borrowers are still refinancing through banks and syndicated markets, while weaker credits increasingly need another source of capital.
That is where private credit differs from bank financing. Banks can offer lower-cost funding to borrowers that fit their underwriting framework, but they also face balance-sheet constraints, syndication requirements and limits on sector risk. Private lenders can structure around more complex situations and provide financing when banks are unwilling to extend enough capital, but they demand a higher return and stronger protection. The borrowers left on the maturity wall increasingly fall into that category. The share trading below 90 cents rose from 33.4% in April 2026 to 39.4% in July. Software’s share of the wall rose from 12.5% to 16.4%, despite a lower euro amount. Builders’ merchants also screen weak. Huws Gray’s 2028 term loan traded around 70-76 in March, while STARK Group’s 2028 loan traded around 72-82. BME’s 2029 term loan also remained under pressure. Cegid shows how the two markets can coexist: the French software group still had €1.04 billion of syndicated debt due in 2028 when it secured a new €1.1 billion private credit facility in June 2026 to finance its acquisition of Shine. Aston Martin shows the implications for existing creditors. HPS Investment Partners led a £550 million financing in July 2026 secured against assets in a newly incorporated subsidiary. Existing creditors subsequently challenged the transfer of intellectual property. The new lender obtained stronger security, while the recovery position of existing creditors came under pressure.
Private credit therefore does not simply replace a bank loan. It changes the balance between price, flexibility and creditor protection. More than 90% of private credit loans are floating rate, so higher base rates feed directly into interest expense. PIK, or payment-in-kind interest, allows a borrower to add interest to the loan balance instead of paying cash. That preserves liquidity temporarily, but increases debt and the eventual refinancing burden. For bondholders, I therefore look beyond the coupon to the full capital structure. Revolvers and first-lien loans rank ahead of senior unsecured bonds, while junior and shareholder loans rank behind them. Operating leases also absorb cash before equity. In a weak auto supplier or chemical company, I want to know exactly who controls the collateral, how much secured debt sits ahead of the bond and what recovery value remains for unsecured creditors. A 7% coupon does not compensate me for poor priority if most of the enterprise value is already pledged to lenders above it. The private lender may have solved the borrower’s funding problem, but the bondholder can still end up with a weaker position.
That is the real difference between the two funding markets. Banks remain the lower-cost option for borrowers that meet their risk criteria. Private credit becomes relevant when the borrower needs more flexibility, a bespoke structure or capital that banks are unwilling to provide. The trade-off is higher pricing and stronger lender protections. European high-yield spreads remain tight relative to their long-term range, so I do not want to take that additional structural risk for a modest incremental yield. I stay senior and short in cyclical sectors such as autos, chemicals and weaker software names. I want no hard maturity inside 18 months unless cash or a tested revolver clearly covers it. Beyond five years, I need enough coupon and covenant protection to compensate for refinancing risk. When I assess a bond, I therefore ask two questions: would a bank still fund this borrower today, and if not, what would a private lender demand in return?
Alessandro Rovelli
Rovelli Research
Independent credit investment research
