In late September I argued that European credit had completed much of its near-term refinancing. Stronger borrowers had extended their maturities, reducing the amount of debt due in 2027–28. The latest data supports that view, but with an important qualification: the remaining borrowers face greater financing challenges. The market has reduced its aggregate refinancing risk, but the weaker credits still need to demonstrate that they can service their debt and secure funding at maturity.
Between July 2025 and July 2026, the amount of European leveraged loans maturing in 2028 fell from €91 billion to €38 billion, a reduction of 58%. The combined amount of European loans maturing in 2026 and 2027 also fell from €9 billion at the end of 2025 to €4 billion at June 2026. Refinancing and extensions accounted for much of the activity. Over the 12 months to September, they represented approximately 67% of European leveraged-loan volume, or €111 billion. The peak of the maturity profile has shifted to 2031, when maturities are projected to reach €99 billion.
This represents a substantial reduction in scheduled maturities. It does not necessarily indicate an equivalent improvement in borrowers’ credit quality. An extension changes the repayment date but does not increase a company’s capacity to repay. Companies that refinanced early secured more time, while those unable to access the market on acceptable terms face fewer options. The 2027–28 maturity wall therefore poses less of a broad market threat than previously feared, although refinancing risk remains concentrated among weaker issuers.
The secondary market offers a further perspective on the remaining maturity wall. By the end of July, nearly 40% of European leveraged loans maturing in 2028 traded below €0.90 per €1 of principal. These discounts can reflect both contractual spreads that lag current market levels and concerns about borrowers’ credit quality, refinancing prospects and potential recovery rates. The price data alone cannot distinguish between these factors or establish that every affected borrower faces distress. It does, however, show that a substantial share of the remaining debt trades at a discount, despite the reduction in aggregate maturities. The next step is to separate loans that offer inadequate spreads from those whose borrowers face genuine refinancing or solvency risks.
Software deserves particular scrutiny, although the sector is not uniformly distressed. Cegid illustrates both the availability and the cost of private financing. In June, the group secured a €1.1 billion private-credit facility to finance its acquisition of Shine after its syndicated financing process had stalled. The facility reportedly carries a margin of 550 basis points over EURIBOR and was issued at 98, compared with a 325-basis-point margin on Cegid’s existing €1.04 billion syndicated loan due in 2028. The new lenders therefore received substantially higher pricing, although differences in maturity and purpose limit the comparability of the two facilities. The transaction shows that private credit can fund large, complex software deals when syndicated markets hesitate, but at a higher financing cost for the borrower. It also leaves Cegid’s existing 2028 maturity unresolved.
Software’s exposure to changing growth assumptions also needs to be assessed at the issuer level. Second-quarter private-credit research found that software had among the lowest default rates of any industry in the dataset. Median software EBITDA was also 20% higher than when those loans were initially originated. These findings do not rule out refinancing pressure among individual borrowers, particularly those with high leverage or business models vulnerable to artificial intelligence. They do, however, argue against assuming that AI disruption has already produced sector-wide credit deterioration. The central credit question is whether each borrower’s operating performance and cash generation can support its capital structure.
Refinancing pressure is not confined to software. Chemicals and building materials also feature among the sectors facing unresolved financing challenges. Rather than identify one industry as the worst-performing, investors should distinguish between borrowers with viable businesses and manageable debt, and those whose repayment depends on a favorable refinancing market, a recovery in demand or further support from their sponsors.
Ratings and capital structure add another dimension. A downgrade into the CCC category can push a loan above the permitted exposure limits of a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) and create pressure to sell. It does not automatically force every CLO holding the loan to dispose of it. The outcome depends on each vehicle’s existing portfolio, applicable limits, the loan’s valuation and the availability of other buyers. A smaller maturity wall can therefore coexist with selling pressure and further price declines among individual issuers.
Private credit provides a complementary view of this concentration of risk. In the second quarter of 2026, 7% of loans in a private-credit dataset were valued below 90% of par, more than twice the historical average. Among borrowers with $10–20 million of EBITDA, the share was 12%, compared with approximately 1% in 2023. For private-credit borrowers with less than $100 million of EBITDA, the default rate reached 4% by borrower count and 3% on a size-weighted basis. These rates include technical defaults as well as payment defaults.
The broader private-credit figures provide an important counterweight. Across the full market, defaults represented 1% of outstanding loan principal, or 3% of borrowers by count. Median revenue rose 7% year over year and median EBITDA increased 7%, with more than two-thirds of borrowers growing both. The data therefore points to concentrated stress rather than a general collapse. Smaller and weaker borrowers face greater pressure, while many larger businesses continue to grow.
For investors, the focus should shift from the size of the aggregate maturity wall to the cash generation and refinancing capacity of individual borrowers. In software, this requires testing whether recurring revenue translates into cash earnings, how much adjusted EBITDA depends on addbacks, whether borrowers actually capitalize interest through payment-in-kind arrangements, and whether cash flow comfortably covers interest payments. Artificial intelligence presents a potential threat to growth and pricing power, but its credit implications depend on each company’s competitive position, financial structure and ability to adapt.
Investors should prioritize short-dated, higher-quality bonds with call protection. These securities can provide contractual income without requiring a substantial decline in credit spreads or depending on a distant refinancing. By contrast, long-dated, low-coupon bonds may offer limited compensation for the risk that their issuers will need to refinance in a market demanding higher yields for weaker credit. Their performance could suffer both from wider spreads and from doubts about refinancing capacity.
Europe has pushed out much of its near-term debt burden, but the remaining borrowers still face significant financing constraints. Their ability to generate cash, cover interest and refinance on sustainable terms will increasingly determine credit performance. The investment case consequently depends less on the size of the market-wide maturity wall and more on the financial strength of each issuer.
Alessandro Rovelli
Rovelli Research
Independent credit investment research
