The most important development in Cerba HealthCare’s restructuring did not happen in a meeting with creditors. It happened on 2 November, when France’s national health insurance fund, complementary insurers and four laboratory unions signed a three-year agreement on laboratory spending.
The agreement sets limits on how much can be spent on routine laboratory tests and creates a committee with the power to adjust tariffs to keep spending within those limits. No lenders signed it. Yet it could have a greater impact on their recovery than anything currently being discussed in the debt negotiations.
Cerba is one of France’s largest medical laboratory groups. In early September, it entered a court-supervised conciliation process to negotiate with creditors over approximately €5 billion of debt. Most attention has focused on the restructuring itself. For lenders, however, the November agreement may be just as important because it directly affects the company’s ability to generate cash and repay its debt.
The revenue problem
Under the previous agreement, which covered 2024 to 2026, laboratory spending is expected to reach approximately €3.9 billion this year.
The new agreement limits annual growth in spending on routine tests to 1.1%. The laboratory unions estimate that the number of tests will naturally increase by 3% to 3.5% a year. The difference will have to be absorbed through lower prices.
A monitoring committee can adjust both the letter key B and individual test tariffs to keep spending within the agreed budget.
There are also additional savings of at least €30 million in 2027 and €10 million in each following year. A separate €100 million budget over three years is reserved for new tests and sits outside these restrictions.
The implications for creditors are significant. Cerba may continue to perform more tests, but that does not mean its revenue will grow at the same rate. The state effectively controls the price of its main product.
For a lender assessing the business, this changes the assumptions behind any cash-flow forecast. Volume growth alone is not enough. The more important question is how much revenue the company can generate from each test after the next round of tariff reductions.
Nearly €5 billion of debt and limited repayment capacity
EQT acquired Cerba from Partners Group in 2021 for approximately $5.3 billion, with PSP Investments taking a minority stake.
At 30 June, net debt exceeded €4.9 billion, equivalent to around nine times trailing EBITDA. Annualising second-quarter EBITDA alone would put leverage closer to ten times.
Second-quarter revenue was approximately €469 million, up 2% year on year. EBITDA exceeded €122 million, an increase of 12%.
The improvement in profitability is encouraging, but it does not solve the debt problem. The company needs to generate substantially more cash than it currently does to reduce a debt burden of this size.
Consider the repayment arithmetic.
If trailing EBITDA is approximately €540 million, consistent with the reported nine-times leverage ratio, and the average interest cost on €4.9 billion of debt is 7%, annual interest expense would be around €340 million. This interest assumption is my estimate, not a disclosed figure.
Assuming capital expenditure of 5% of revenue, or approximately €94 million a year, the company would have just over €100 million left before tax and working-capital movements.
At that rate, repaying €4.9 billion of debt would take around 45 years, assuming no changes in operating performance, prices or interest costs.
That is not a credible deleveraging plan. And the new agreement makes the revenue assumptions behind it less certain.
Cerba had access to approximately €108 million of liquidity in June. EQT provided €100 million of additional support earlier this year, but as a loan rather than equity. The period during which interest payments could be deferred was also extended into November.
In July, S&P described the debt as unsustainable and expected a default within six months.
For lenders, the question is no longer simply whether Cerba can continue operating. It is how much of the existing debt can realistically be recovered.
Three issues lenders should examine
There are three particular risks that deserve attention when assessing Cerba’s debt and the potential recovery for creditors.
1. Liquidity buys time, not debt reduction
The €108 million of available liquidity is small compared with €4.9 billion of debt.
It gives the company time to negotiate, but does not repair its balance sheet. The €100 million shareholder loan provides additional support, but it also adds debt rather than reducing leverage through new equity.
The extension of the interest grace period is another temporary measure. It delays cash payments but does not resolve the underlying repayment problem.
For a lender, it is important to distinguish between a company that has enough liquidity to survive a restructuring and one that can generate enough cash to repay its obligations.
Cerba currently has the former, not necessarily the latter.
2. Security and recovery are not the same thing
A €28 million portion of the revolving credit facility was sold in September, while restructuring discussions were under way.
That is worth watching. A lender selling part of its exposure during negotiations may be reducing its risk rather than waiting for the outcome.
There is also exposure through less visible financial structures. In November 2025, 9fin reported that an Apollo-held leveraged loan significant risk transfer included Cerba among its stressed borrowers.
This is a reminder that Cerba’s financial difficulties may affect investors who do not hold its bonds or loans directly.
For lenders assessing the capital structure, the important questions are who actually holds the credit risk, where the debt ranks and what protection is available if the restructuring fails.
A diversified portfolio does not necessarily provide much protection when one of its underlying borrowers is already under severe financial pressure.
3. The assets supporting the debt are difficult to take control of
There is another complication in Cerba’s ownership structure.
The debt sits at the holding company level, while the laboratories operate through regulated subsidiaries. French law requires medical laboratories to be majority owned by the biologists who work in them.
This creates a gap between the location of the debt and the businesses generating the cash.
Lenders may be able to take control of the holding company through a debt-for-equity restructuring. But that does not automatically give them control of the operating laboratories.
The biologists remain important shareholders and are essential to the group’s operations. A restructuring that ignores their position could leave new owners with control of the holding company but limited influence over the people running the underlying business.
This is a particularly important consideration when assessing security and recovery. The value of the assets on paper is not necessarily the value lenders can realise in practice.
The issue is not simply whether creditors have security. It is whether that security gives them effective control over the businesses and cash flows supporting their claims.
The political dimension
Cerba’s restructuring also has a political dimension.
A parliamentary commission reported in June on what it described as the acquisition of French productive businesses by speculative investment funds. It recommended tighter rules for funds it believed were operating without sufficient oversight.
Laboratory employees went on strike in May over pay. Cerballiance, Cerba’s French laboratory network, also suffered a cyberattack at the end of March.
The restructuring is therefore taking place against a difficult public backdrop. It involves a heavily indebted healthcare group, private equity ownership, employees concerned about their conditions and a government directly controlling the spending framework.
This makes a negotiated outcome more likely than a straightforward creditor-led restructuring.
The government needs the laboratories to continue operating. The biologists need to protect their businesses. Creditors need to recover as much as possible. These interests do not necessarily point in the same direction.
For lenders, the final recovery will depend not only on the financial negotiations but also on what the government and the operating professionals are prepared to accept.
The sector is still financeable
I would not draw the conclusion that French medical laboratories are no longer attractive lending opportunities.
Biogroup refinanced €2.7 billion of debt in May, although it had to pay a high price to secure the financing.
The sector can still attract capital. The question is how much debt a business can support, at what interest cost and with what protection for lenders.
Cerba shows what happens when the original financing assumptions no longer hold. High leverage, limited cash generation, regulated pricing and a complicated ownership structure can leave creditors with few good options.
What this means for credit investors
Cerba raises three questions that apply well beyond the healthcare sector.
First, who controls the revenue? When a company cannot freely set the price of its products or services, lenders need to understand the regulatory framework and how frequently prices can change. Revenue growth based on higher volumes may not translate into higher cash flow.
Second, where are the assets and cash flows? A lender needs to understand the relationship between the borrowing entity, the operating companies and the assets supporting the debt. Security at holding company level may offer less protection than expected if the underlying businesses are difficult to control or transfer.
Third, what is the sponsor actually contributing? Additional shareholder loans provide liquidity but do not reduce leverage in the same way as new equity. The distinction is important when assessing sponsor support and the likelihood of further capital injections.
In Cerba’s case, the answers are uncomfortable. Revenue is subject to government controls, the operating laboratories are partly owned by the professionals running them, and the sponsor’s recent €100 million contribution was a loan rather than equity.
Together, these factors make the recovery difficult to assess and argue against assuming that creditors will be repaid in full.
What could change my view?
Three developments would improve the recovery outlook.
A better pricing agreement: An increase in the 1.1% annual spending allowance would support revenue and cash generation. I consider this unlikely given the constraints on the 2027 budget.
Further asset sales: The sale of Lifeanalytics to Eurofins in September shows that disposals are possible. More substantial sales, with proceeds used to reduce debt rather than simply support liquidity, would help.
New equity from EQT: A fresh equity contribution would demonstrate stronger sponsor support and directly reduce the debt burden.
Any one of these would improve the position of creditors. A combination would make a more meaningful difference.
My credit view
The most likely outcome is a negotiated restructuring rather than a full repayment of existing debt.
The conciliation process normally runs for four months and can be extended once. The current timetable therefore points towards a resolution around the turn of the year or, at the latest, early February.
The final recovery will depend on the proceeds from asset sales, the amount of new capital available and the value investors place on a business whose prices are being reduced by government policy.
I would not assume full recovery anywhere in the capital structure.
Cerba is a useful reminder that lending risk is not just about leverage and interest coverage. It is also about who controls the revenue, where the assets sit and what lenders can actually recover when a company runs into difficulty.
For lenders considering French healthcare financing, these questions deserve as much attention as the financial model itself.
Alessandro Rovelli
Rovelli Research
Independent credit investment research
